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Antitrust Enforcement And Sectoral  
Regulation: !e Competition Policy Bene"ts 
Of Concurrent Enforcement In !e  
     Communications Sector  
By Jonathan Baker 
Jonathan Baker1
The US competition agencies – the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – o!en share jurisdiction with 
sectoral regulators also charged with fostering competition, including the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), and several agencies that regulate "nancial institutions.  #is article highlights 
how this institutional structure – concurrent jurisdiction – helps protect competition 
through the lens of recent US experiences involving the communications industry.
I. THE ROLE OF POLITICS
In my experience, the FCC pays more attention than the antitrust agencies to political 
considerations2. One window into why this occurs comes from comparing the FCC 
and FTC.  #ese agencies have a similar formal structure:  each is an independent 
agency with Commissioners from both political parties, and each has both rulemak-
ing and adjudicative powers.  Despite these similarities, the agencies have di$erent 
internal atmospheres, with politics mattering more at the FCC.  My sense is that there 
are two main reasons. 
First, the FCC focuses on a single sector of the economy: communications. 
#is focus puts the FCC in “repeated play” with providers of wireless, wireline, video 
distribution, and satellite services. In consequence, large communications "rms like 
AT&T and Comcast devote substantial “Washington o%ce” resources to monitoring 
FCC activities and interacting with agency o%cials, as well as engaging with other 
governmental actors in Congress and the Executive Branch that in&uence communi-
cations policy. By contrast, the antitrust agencies’ jurisdiction is economy-wide and, 
most "rms, even large ones, tend to view their interactions with the competition agen-
cies as episodic not routine.3 #is di$erence means that, on average, the FCC confronts 
more concentrated interest groups, which tend to be able to organize politically (by 
solving collective action problems) more e$ectively than “di$use” groups.4
#e second reason that the FCC seems more political than the FTC comes 
from di$erences in the nature of each agency’s work. #e typical FTC matter is ad-
judicative, whether on the competition side of the house or the consumer protection 
side.5 Accordingly, the FTC is guided by judicial norms. Agency decisions are based 
on law and policy, not politics, and the agency describes itself as performing a law 
enforcement function.6  By contrast, the typical FCC matter is a rulemaking, which 
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is o!en a quasi-legislative activity. As a result, legislative norms guide at the FCC:  the agency 
pays attention to the views of interested parties and groups (not just the arguments those parties 
pro"er), and at times aims, at least in part, to work out an interest group bargain.7 #ese broad 
generalizations brush over much of the $ne detail by which individual matters are decided at the 
two agencies, but they capture an important di"erence. 
II. CAPTURE
#e greater role of politics at the FCC does not necessarily mean that the agency’s performance 
is better or worse than that of the FTC. It may be sensible use of governmental resources, for 
example, for Congress in e"ect to delegate to an agency the identi$cation and rati$cation of 
interest group bargains8; under such circumstances, the agency itself would be performing as 
intended, and any concerns about agency outcomes would properly be attributable to the leg-
islature, not the agency.9 As with legislation itself, though, there is no guarantee that outcomes 
based on interest group bargains will serve the public good – most obviously if some a"ected 
groups are systematically underrepresented in political processes, but even if all groups are at 
the table.10
Still, single sector agencies like the FCC are o!en considered more prone to “capture” 
by regulated industries than generalist agencies with a broad cross-industry purview like the 
competition agencies. Agencies are described as “captured” when they appear to favor the inter-
ests of the regulated industries over public interest concerns like promoting competition.11  #is 
charge has at times been leveled at the FCC.12 By contrast, when the FTC is criticized, it is gen-
erally not for capture but for other occasional failings, like lethargy,13  taking “cheap consents”14 
or its general approach to antitrust.15
Agency capture is largely not about direct political 
in%uence.16 If an agency makes a bad decision because it 
has little insulation when the a"ected industry complains 
to Congress, the problem is the capture of the legislature, 
not the capture of the agency.  Capture is also not mainly 
the product of the “revolving door” (the movement of per-
sonnel between regulatory agencies and regulated $rms, 
in both directions). In my experience, industry jobs go to 
agency veterans largely because they are seen as e"ective 
and have developed expertise, not because of the positions 
they took as agency o&cials.17 Moreover, the revolving door 
helps bring good people into agencies, both at the start of their careers, when they may value 
the option of leaving later, and later in their careers, when they can use skills and experience 
developed outside on behalf of the public interest.  
My sense is that capture is a threat at the FCC mainly when the regulated industry can 
manage the agency’s information.18 When an industry speaks with one voice, and has privileged 
access to the relevant information, it can shape how the agency sees an issue.  #e FCC’s engi-
neering and economic expertise in critically reviewing the information submitted by industry 
only goes so far without data.  Moreover, the competition agencies typically obtain more infor-
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mation using compulsory processes than the FCC obtains through voluntary submissions and 
routine data collection from regulated !rms, particularly in a political environment in which 
the latter activity may be questioned as imposing unnecessary burdens on industry.  
 
 Many FCC decisions are not subject to biases resulting from information asymmetry. 
In 2011, when the FCC reviewed AT&T’s proposed acquisition of T-Mobile, it was in a strong 
position to avoid regulatory capture notwithstanding AT&T’s extensive lobbying e"ort:19 the 
concurrent DOJ review gave it access to the type of information that the antitrust agencies 
obtain through use of compulsory process, and the industry did not speak with one voice (as 
one major wireless provider expressed concerns about the acquisition). To the extent capture is 
nevertheless a concern with the FCC today, it could be addressed in part by expanding the range 
of information the FCC requires regulated !rms to submit on a routine basis.
III. TAKING A LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE
 
In the U.S. system, sectoral regulators have an advantage over the competition agencies in pro-
tecting potential competition, particularly when dealing with fast-moving markets.  It is di#cult 
for the competition agencies to take a long term focus in their enforcement actions because the 
generalist district court judges they must convince rarely have prior industry expertise and may 
in consequence tend to view predictions about industry evolution as speculative. By contrast, 
the FCC is the fact-!nder in its decisions and can bring more expertise and sustained attention 
to understanding industry evolution.
 As a practical consequence, the FCC can take a longer view than the competition agen-
cies. It has used that power to stop or impose conditions of some mergers that the Justice De-
partment could not easily challenge because the !rms involved were potential rivals rather than 
current competitors. $e FCC stopped the 1997 merger talks between AT&T, then a long dis-
tance company, and SBC, a large local telephone service provider and regional Bell operating 
company.20 $e FCC also imposed competition-related condi-
tions on the 1997 merger between Bell Atlantic and NYNEX, 
two local telephone service providers in adjoining territories, 
when the Justice Department declined to sue.21 $e Justice 
Department’s position on that matter was likely colored by 
the di#culty it would have faced in proving a potential com-
petition case to a federal judge.22 Similarly, it likely would have 
been more di#cult for the Justice Department to address po-
tential competition issues involving online video distribution 
raised by the recent Comcast/NBCU transaction had the FCC 
not also been involved.23 Moreover, the FCC was better situ-
ated than an antitrust agency to address the long-term potential competition issues that were 
the subject of the FCC’s Open Internet (net neutrality) rules.24 $e FCC rejected the alternative 
of relying solely on ex-post competition review, the approach that competition agencies would 
have taken,25 on the view that review a%er problems arise would be ine"ective and too late.26    
 I am not arguing that sectoral regulators are either more or less likely to make good 
IN THE U.S. SYSTEM, SECTORAL 
REGULATORS HAVE AN 
ADVANTAGE OVER THE 
COMPETITION AGENCIES IN 
PROTECTING POTENTIAL 
COMPETITION, PARTICULARLY 
WHEN DEALING WITH FAST-
MOVING MARKETS. 
Vol. 9 | Number 1| Spring 2013              3
decisions than competition agencies.  Rather, my point is that in the US system, the sectoral 
regulator is better able to act consistent with a long-term view of industry evolution. !e two 
examples from 1997 involving telephone sector mergers show that doing so can be important 
when policy-makers seek to develop competitive markets in formerly regulated sectors.  !e 
Open Internet example distinguishes sectoral and competition agencies only if the latter decline 
to use rulemaking on competition matters.27 In short, as the FCC explained in a recent order, 
the FCC’s competitive analysis under its public interest standard is “somewhat broader” than 
competition review under the antitrust laws in that the FCC “considers whether a transaction 
will enhance, rather than merely preserve, existing competition,” and the FCC “o"en takes a 
more expansive view of potential and future competition” than the antitrust agencies in analyz-
ing that issue.28 
IV. PURSUING MULTIPLE GOALS 
!e close cooperation between the FCC and DOJ in reviewing the Comcast/NBCU transac-
tion, and the similarity in the remedies the two agencies adopted, points to another bene#t 
of concurrent merger review by a competition enforcement agency alongside a sector-speci#c 
regulator: a type of “production e$ciency” in generating governmental outcomes. Concurrent 
review can improve overall outcomes by allowing the two agencies to exploit their complemen-
tary strengths.
 !e FCC and the antitrust agencies approach merger review in di%erent ways.29 One 
di%erence is in the allocation of the burden of proof:  at the FCC, the merging #rms must show 
that their deal is in the public interest, while the antitrust agencies must show harm to competi-
tion in federal court. Another is in how evidence is collected and tested:  the FCC relies mainly 
on submissions from the parties and interested third parties in a rule-making record, while the 
antitrust agencies contact potential witnesses and use discovery tools like depositions to test ev-
idence. Concurrent enforcement can enhance competition enforcement as a whole by drawing 
on the strengths of each agency.
 One advantage of the FTC and DOJ lies in their focus: the Antitrust Division concen-
trates on competition issues only, and the FTC addresses only competition and consumer pro-
tection.  Focus is bene#cial because it is easier to make decisions when pursuing a single goal. 
But government is about pursuing multiple goals.  Congress has asked the FCC to promote 
communications industry competition, but also to pursue 
non-competition public interest goals.  !ese may include, 
for example, protecting consumers when the communica-
tions industry contains natural monopoly sectors, where 
competition will not succeed; preventing interference when 
allocating spectrum;30 assuring a diversity of information 
sources and voices; and subsidizing broadband access to cus-
tomers that are very costly to serve.31   
 Some critics of the FCC’s merger reviews #nd it un-
seemly that the FCC’s orders frequently address public interest issues that go beyond compe-
tition.32 Yet so long as sector regulators are instructed by Congress to pursue a broader range 
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of concerns, their merger orders will properly and necessarily include conditions related to 
non-competition goals.  Under such circumstances, concurrent review ensures that competi-
tion concerns are not downplayed. For that reason, it is important to protect the antitrust fo-
cus of the competition agencies, either by housing that function in a separate agency (as with 
the FTC) or a separate division with practical independence (as with the Antitrust Division 
at DOJ).  From this institutional perspective, the recent trend at the Supreme Court to award 
primary jurisdiction over competition issues to sector regulators, rather than embracing con-
current jurisdiction, is troubling.33    
 Concurrent jurisdiction requires cross-agency coordination.  If coordination is much 
easier within agencies than across them, then a single agency pursuing multiple goals can 
achieve signi!cant scope economies unavailable to multiple agencies.  I do not believe that to 
be the case:  in my experience, coordination across agencies can work well, and coordination 
within agencies can be di"cult.  During the !rst term of the Obama Administration, the FCC 
and DOJ worked together closely on a number of transaction reviews, including two high-pro-
!le ones:  Comcast/NBCU and AT&T/T-Mobile.  One reason for the cooperative relationship is 
that the FCC’s Chairman and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust selected senior sta# 
who in many cases knew each other, and knew how the other agency worked.  Another is that 
these merger reviews occurred close in time, so the agencies had recent experience working 
together on a complex transaction when the second merger came along.  $is anecdote shows 
that coordination can succeed, not that it invariably will. But the same is true about coordina-
tion within agencies, where di#erent components may jockey for the ear of decision-makers, the 
lion’s share of the budget, and control of shared matters.  
V. CONCLUSION
$e recent US experience in the communications arena shows how the nation’s system of 
awarding concurrent jurisdiction on antitrust questions to sectoral regulators and competition 
agencies works to protect competition.  $at system is likely most e#ective when the commu-
nications regulatory has independent access to industry information to limit capture, when the 
communications regulator can take a long-term perspective, when the antitrust agency can fo-
cus on competition as its sole goal, and when senior appointments at the two agencies are made 
with coordination between them in mind.
1. Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.  $is article is informed by my 
government service in economic policy-making positions at the FCC, FTC, DOJ and the Council of Economic 
Advisers.  At all of these agencies, I worked, at least in part, on communications industry issues, including some 
of the matters discussed here.  None of my views are necessarily those of any government agency. 
2. Cf. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C. 2d 393 (1965) (recognizing that the 
FCC will change its views as its membership changes); STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET. AL, TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 412 (3d ed. 2012) (describing the politics of the FCC’s 2003 Triennial Review 
Order and the “bluntness” of statements by two Commissioners in revealing that they had to compromise on 
some matters to obtain the results they desired on others). I cannot recall comparable statements by the FTC or 
its Commissioners, or by senior o"cials at the Antitrust Division. 
3. Some large !rms, including Cisco, General Electric, and Microso%, employ senior competition counsel 
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in-house. But those positions are not always in Washington, and they typically involve antitrust counseling and 
litigation supervision (as well as working with the competition agencies). 
4. Cf. James Q. Wilson, BUREAUCRACY 79 (1989) (“A client agency will have to struggle mightily to 
avoid having its work in!uenced by the single, organized group with which it must deal on a daily basis.  Many 
do not succeed, a few do not even try.”)  "e FCC can be understood as a “client agency’ in Wilson’s four part 
typology, though it might better be viewed as what Wilson terms a “interest group agency” with respect to issues 
that pit one sector of the communications industry against another.  Id. at 75-83. 
5. "is broad generalization does not capture every FTC activity.  "e FTC also occasionally issues con-
sumer protection rules, and makes competition advocacy #lings before other government agencies, for example. 
6. Ideological perspectives do matter in antitrust enforcement. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Economics 
and Politics:  Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.  2175 (2013); cf. Steven 
C. Salop, What Consensus?  Ideology, Politics and Elections Still Matter (April 2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
(arguing that politics is less of a driving force in antitrust today than ideology). While ideology might be thought 
of as politics at a distance, the discussion of issues and cases at the FTC is largely about ideas and arguments, not 
the positions of interest groups. 
7. See, e.g., Schurz  Commc’n., Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1050 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (describing an 
FCC rule as creating an impression “of unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg complexity among contend-
ing interest groups viewed merely as clamoring supplicants who have somehow to be conciliated” and observing 
that “[t]he possibility of resolving a con!ict in favor of the party with the stronger case, as distinct from throwing 
up one’s hands and splitting the di$erence, was overlooked”).  Cf. Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband In-
dustry Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17,905 (2010) (statements of Chairman Genachowski and Commissioners Copps, 
Clyburn and Baker) (in statements accompanying the release of the FCC’s Open Internet order, the Commission’s 
Chairman cited the support key groups gave to its framework, one concurring Commissioner noted that he had 
spent three weeks in intensive discussions with all interested parties, another concurring Commissioner thanked 
the stakeholders that had engaged with the FCC in cra%ing a framework, and a dissenting Commissioner argued 
that the FCC had acted improperly as a quasi-legislative body by adopting as its rules the provisions in a dra% bill 
under consideration in Congress). 
8. "is role is explicit when the agency engages in “negotiated rulemaking,” though it also may be implicit.  
See Je$rey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus:  "e (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemak-
ing, 49 S. Texas L. Rev. 987 (2008). 
9. Congress has multiple levers for in!uencing agency outcomes.  It can, for example, hold oversight 
hearings, overrule speci#c decisions, force an agency to take into account certain considerations, extract promises 
from nominees before con#rmation, and shape an agency’s budget. 
10. See generally Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase "eorem?  Social Con!ict, Commitment and 
Politics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 620 (2003). 
11. "e term “agency capture” refers to settings in which regulatory decisions favor the interests of regulated 
#rms relative to the public interest.  See generally Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 203 (2006); "eodore E. Keeler & Stephen E. Foreman, Regulation and Deregulation, in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 213 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998); cf. Dorit 
Rubinstein Reiss, "e Bene#ts of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (2012) (discussing di$erences between 
harmful capture of agencies by regulated #rms and bene#cial collaboration between agencies and regulated 
#rms). 
12. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, "e Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 77 (1981) (during the 1960s and 1970s, the FCC regulated cable television in order to protect the 
broadcasting industry). 
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13. E.g. EDWARD F. COX, ROBERT C. FELLMETH & JOHN E. SCHULTZ, ‘THE NADER REPORT’ ON 
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 37-95 (1969) (Nader report). 
14. See William J. Baer, Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Report from the Bureau of 
Competition:  Looking Forward and Going  Forward (Mar. 28, 1996), available at http://www.!c.gov/speeches/
other/ababaer.shtm (criticizing past practice of accepting quick and limited consent settlements of mergers before 
the FTC’s investigation was complete). 
15. Eleanor Fox & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy, in CHANGING AMERICA:  BLUEPRINTS FOR THE 
NEW ADMINISTRATION 319 (Mark Green ed. 1992). 
16. Lobbying may help improve legislative and agency outcomes to the extent it operates as a means of 
informing government decision-makers about the costs and bene"ts of their actions when the decision-makers 
would not have obtained that information inexpensively in other ways.  Cf. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, #e Bene"ts 
of Capture, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 569, 595 (2012) (discussing bene"ts of collaboration between agencies and 
regulated "rms). But other lobbying activity is undoubtedly wasteful rent-seeking. 
17. See Ed de Haan, Simi Kedia, Kevin Koh & Shivara Rajgopal, Does the Revolving Door A$ect the SEC’s 
Enforcement Outcomes? (July 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125560 (revolving door induces 
agency lawyers to exert more enforcement e$ort to showcase their expertise).  In both the antitrust and commu-
nications "elds, moreover, the professional culture generally does not encourage lawyers to “take sides” for their 
entire career; the culture in some other legal "elds, like labor law, appears to di$er. 
18. See generally Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, Recent Developments in the #eory of Reg-
ulation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1557 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter, eds. 
2007) (analyzing the consequences for regulatory outcomes when regulators have limited knowledge of the "rms 
they regulate); Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 220 (2006) 
(the “main lesson[]” of prevailing theories is that “capture is possible because "rms have private information that 
is hard for citizens or their political representatives to obtain”).  Cf. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, #e Bene"ts of Cap-
ture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 599-601 (2012) (discussing problems that arise when regulatory agencies 
rely on regulated "rms for information). 
19. See, e.g., Tony Romm, Lobbying a Bust in AT&T T-Mobile Bid, POLITICO, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/1211/70701.html; Todd Shields & Jonathan Salant, AT&T Dealt Deal Defeat A!er 
$12M in Lobbying, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 1, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-01/at-t-s-12-mil-
lion-lobbying-spree-fails-to-prevent-rare-antitrust-setback.html. 
20. I recount this story in Jonathan B. Baker, Sector-Speci"c Competition Enforcement at the FCC, 66 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 417-18 (2011). 
21. See id. at 418-20. 
22. Id. at 420 
23. Compare Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC Universal, Inc., 
For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC 
Rcd. 4238 ¶¶ 78-86 (2011), available at transition.fcc.gov/FCC-11-4.pdf (describing online video distribution as 
mainly o$ering potential competition for multichannel video distribution (cable television), while also not-
ing current competition between the two types of "rms) with Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. 
Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106 18-18 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f266100/266158.pdf (highlighting existing competition, while also recognizing the potential for online video 
distributors to have greater competitive signi"cance in the future). 
24. Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17,905 (2010). 
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25. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy (FTC Sta! Report 2007), http://
www."c.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf. 
26. Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17,905 ¶41 (2010). 
27. #e FTC has competition rule-making power but has rarely used it.  Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman 
Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic #eory, 38 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 143, 207-19 (1993); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data 
and Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 673-82 (2009).  Under some circum-
stances, competition agencies can successfully address nascent problems without rulemaking, using adjudication. 
See United States v. Microso" Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
28. Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC Universal, Inc., For Con-
sent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238 
¶24 (2011), available at transition.fcc.gov/FCC-11-4.pdf. 
29. #e di!erences noted below and others are discussed in Jonathan B. Baker, Sector-Speci$c Competition 
Enforcement at the FCC, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 414-16 (2011). 
30. Market-based alternatives for addressing interference, such as relying on bargaining among spectrum 
users in the shadow of nuisance litigation, may o"en have higher transaction costs. 
31. Nearly two-thirds of the pages devoted to conditions in the FCC’s Comcast/NBCU order addressed 
competition issues. Yet the FCC’s order also included a number of non-competition conditions, including re-
quirements to increase local news coverage, expand children’s programming, broadcast public service announce-
ments, enhance the diversity of programming available to Spanish-speaking viewers, o!er discount broadband 
services to low-income Americans, and provide high-speed broadband to schools, libraries and underserved 
communities.  Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC Universal, Inc., For 
Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 
4238 at Appendix A (2011), available at transition.fcc.gov/FCC-11-4.pdf. 
32. E.g. Joint Concurring Statement of Commissioners Robert M. McDowell and Meredith Attwell Bak-
er, Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC Universal, Inc., For Consent to 
Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238 (2011), 
available at, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-304134A4.pdf (“License transfer approvals 
should not serve as vehicles to extract from petitioners far-reaching and non-merger speci$c policy concessions 
that are best le" to broader rulemaking or legislative processes.”) 
33. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law O%ces of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Credit Suisse Sec. 
(USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). See Howard A. Shelanski, #e Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and 
Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2011).
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